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Cognitive Mobilization
The concept of Cognitive Mobilization (CM) put forward by 
Inglehart (1977, 1990) states that in postindustrial societies, 
how citizens’ political participation is formed is affected by 
the fact that they are generally better educated and have 
increased access to information. Inglehart studies the evolu-
tion of CM and its effects in different societies to make com-
parative observations of how much it depends on other 
factors, such as economic and cultural development. To mea-
sure the influence of these factors, Inglehart combines a cross-
sectional analysis of European societies (observing different 
levels of economic development) with, principally, a longitu-
dinal study to determine the effect that the level of education 
has on different age groups, under the clear premise that levels 
of education and access to information are on the rise. This 
article considers Inglehart’s hypotheses and updates the time 
frame that he analyzed by a matter of decades. Extending this 
time period not only corroborates some of Inglehart’s conclu-
sions but also introduces nuances and modifications in others, 
in the light of the analysis of new data.
Inglehart sees CM as a central aspect within a broader 
process. The context is that of modernization and the devel-
opment of Western societies. In his work, The Silent 
Revolution, he defines it as follows:
We are interested in these changes insofar as they con-
tribute to the process of Cognitive Mobilization. The 
essence of this process is the development of the skills 
needed to manipulate political abstractions and thereby 
to coordinate activities that are remote in space or 
time. Without such skills, one is more or less doomed 
to remain an outsider to the political life of a modern 
nation-state. Consequently, historical changes in the 
distribution of these skills have been a major factor in 
defining the politically relevant public.
Social Mobilization is a broad process. Western countries 
have long since completed many of its most important 
stages, such as urbanisation, basic industrialisation, wide-
spread literacy, mass military service, and universal suf-
frage. Nevertheless, an essential aspect continues -the 
very core of the process: the increasingly wide dissemi-
nation of the skills necessary to cope with an extensive 
political community. We use the term “Cognitive 
Mobilization” to refer to this central aspect of the broader 
process. (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 295-297)
In the model developed, the established sequence con-
siders structural changes in various fields (economic, 
social, political, and cultural) that mutually affect one 
another: Development and economic and urban growth due 
to modernization run parallel to the process of a better edu-
cated and more informed population and to an end to scar-
city. The end of scarcity produces a change in hierarchy of 
predominant values, moving from those aimed at satisfying 
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basic needs (security) to those aimed at meeting the need 
for self-expression.
Of all these changes, the most significant in CM terms is 
that of the population being better educated and more 
informed. This increase is central because it means increased 
autonomy for subjects in terms of bureaucratized forms and 
classic hierarchies linked to politics (the political party, 
chiefly), a preference for new (unconventional) forms of par-
ticipation and, in short, an approximation of the practice of 
direct (top-down) democracy.
Thus, the development of the concept of CM relates 
clearly to the classical meaning of the concept of public 
opinion: the discussion of public issues by informed citizens. 
To an extent, it takes up the idea of small political communi-
ties in which political communication occurs face-to-face 
and develops through direct knowledge of public issues, 
facilitating collective decision making.
A precursor to what could in terms of political culture be 
called the “cognitive mobilization theory” is the concept of 
“subjective political competence” as described by Almond 
and Verba (1964), which is used to study citizen involvement 
in the political system. Their interest was to establish a the-
ory as to how citizens perceived political structures and insti-
tutions by studying their opinions. The aim was to observe to 
what extent people surveyed believed that they could partici-
pate in political decisions at a local level. The greater the 
subjective competence, the higher the probability of being 
politically active. The authors conclude that well-informed 
citizens with higher status possess greater subjective compe-
tence (defined as the extent to which citizens think that they 
can influence political decisions) and a higher chance of par-
ticipating in politics. Alongside this sense of “political effi-
cacy” is “political orientation” (community involvement and 
very politically informed).
Much of the literature on CM has focused on the link to 
political parties. The oldest precursors of this are found in 
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954), who were the first to 
reflect on the phenomenon of party identification. For these 
authors, this phenomenon is psychological and it has emo-
tional components that are formed during the process of 
socialization, and the main source of which is the family. 
They are interested in how attitudes are formed and political 
participation, with the political party as the main agent. 
Campbell and Converse (1960), however, draw the conclu-
sion that the political party acts as a funnel model. As an 
agent of political socialization, this model determines the 
attitudes and votes of citizens, who develop a feeling of emo-
tional identification toward a party’s “label.” The conclusion 
is that it is political parties that translate abstract political 
concepts for citizens and offer them an interpretation of 
reality.
Another concept closely linked to CM is “political sophis-
tication,” as discussed by Converse (1964), who studies the 
degree of influence of ideology and beliefs in political 
behavior. The author’s aim is to determine the degree of 
coherence of citizens’ ideological constructs and measure 
their ability to understand and apply political information 
when assessing certain issues or deciding how to vote. The 
relationship between interpretation, system of beliefs, and 
education leads to the concept of “political sophistication.” 
For Converse, the most politically sophisticated are those 
who are most highly educated, politically involved, and well 
informed, while political party identification facilitated the 
decision-making process for voting, preferably in less politi-
cally sophisticated voters. Another important contribution is 
Shively’s (1979) functional model, in which political parties 
translate political information for citizens. This is because 
party identification is a cost-saving device in the decision-
making process of which party to vote for. With higher levels 
of education, there is less need for party guidance.
Together with Inglehart, Dalton’s works have been the most 
influential in the research of CM. Dalton (1984) uses the con-
cept of “cognitive mobilization” to create a classification sys-
tem for political party identification that is widely used in the 
study of political participation (apartisans, cognitive partisans, 
ritual partisans, and apoliticals). Dalton defines CM as a pro-
cess by which more people acquire the resources and skills that 
help them to face the complexities of politics and make their 
own decisions. The variables of level of education and interest 
in politics are used to create the index. For Dalton, just as for 
Inglehart, a progressive increase in education leads to an 
increase in independent citizens (high CM and low party iden-
tification). Although he observes that party identification has 
been positively correlated with CM, this relationship should 
change when younger cohorts are incorporated, as not only do 
they have higher levels of education, they also have greater 
access to political information through their exposure to the 
mass media.
Dalton’s work has had notable repercussions and has been 
widely reviewed by other authors, including the author him-
self (Dalton, 2007), presenting new models that analyze 
party identification. In general, criticism of the Dalton model 
comes from the empirical evidence that in some countries, 
party identification has not dropped in any considerable way, 
and has even risen. Dalton defends himself from criticism in 
a recent study on German voters (2010). In his review of 
Dalton’s works, Albright (2009) asserts that it is risky to 
draw any conclusions regarding the progressive drop in party 
identification. The problem arises when the two phenomena 
occur simultaneously (identification and CM based on the 
indicators for “interest in politics” and “level of education”), 
in which case it is impossible to determine whether CM is 
the cause (Albright, 2009, p. 251).
Berglund, Holmberg, Schmitt, and Thomassen (2005) 
observe that contextual factors have not been taken suffi-
ciently into account, such as the degree of polarization between 
parties. Polarization may lead subjects to perceive greater 
ideological differences between parties and for party identifi-
cation and partisanship to rise. Huber, Kernel, and Leoni 
(2005) assert that changes in party identification may be due 
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more to the institutional political context than to changes in 
social structure, and that the degree of party identification 
depends on the nature of the competition between parties.
In general, it is assumed that deficiencies in the models 
applied in Europe are the result of the differences in the 
political and electoral system, the political culture, and other 
historic aspects. Contextual factors, for instance, have not 
been sufficiently developed, although some authors have 
pointed this out in the study of political involvement and 
party identification. This clearly responds to the difficulty in 
incorporating an excess of variables into such a study, but 
according to Inglehart’s concept of CM (central part of a 
broad process), this is essential.
It could be concluded that CM theory encompasses all 
works that use it as an explanatory variable of the changes that 
occur among younger generations in postindustrial societies, 
characterized at times by low levels of electoral participation 
and party identification. Discussion in recent years over the 
theory is whether there really are more or fewer “partisans” in 
terms of identification and whether there is more or less par-
ticipation in elections for Dalton’s different categories of par-
tisans. It is our belief that within the CM theory, its influence 
on voting and party identification has been overstated in many 
studies, particularly those referring to the United States.
Whereas for Dalton, CM is used as an independent vari-
able to explain changes in party identification and voting, 
Inglehart uses it to explain contemporary political culture in 
terms of participation. However, in both cases, the relation-
ships of causality are hard to establish. In Dalton’s terms, 
CM is what explains the changes in participation and party 
identification, with important criticism, as stated previously. 
In Inglehart’s view, CM is above all a symptom: Structural 
changes have their correlation in the variation of CM just as 
in changes in values, education, and information. In turn, by 
changing how citizens perceive and participate in politics (in 
terms of political efficacy), CM has an influence on these 
factors and on contextual factors. In fact, as has been seen, 
various articles refer to these factors as aspects that have not 
been sufficiently dealt with in theory and which would 
explain the differences between countries (political culture, 
history, electoral system, or political system) or between dif-
ferent historic moments (electoral polarization, and crisis 
and inflation, which are treated lightly by Inglehart).
However, here we are concerned with an interesting product 
of Inglehart’s studies: how political participation takes shape. 
Due to the effect of disassociation with parties, the rise in infor-
mation and the change in priority in terms of young people’s 
values (more postmaterialist), electoral participation is not the 
only form of political expression. Unconventional forms of 
political action and the formation of ad hoc structures as a way 
of making demands are more likely in societies with a higher 
level of CM. Due to the effects of increased education, the gen-
erational change means an increase in “potential” political par-
ticipation and, more importantly, a drop in the importance of 
suffrage. For a population that has moved beyond materialist 
values, the vote is no longer as important. There are other prior-
ity interests (environment, solidarity, identity) where uncon-
ventional forms of political expression can be used, relegating 
the vote to a secondary plane. Votes will be used to the extent 
that the issues at stake in the ballot box will affect what is 
hoped to be achieved according to these new values.
In short, for the purposes of this study, the conceptual and 
working definitions developed by Inglehart in his publica-
tions are used here. The main virtues of Inglehart’s work can 
be summed up in the following aspects: (a) It incorporates the 
concept of CM as a “potential” political action, conceived as 
a central aspect within a broader process of modernization of 
the political systems; (b) it attends to the different forms of 
political action (including unconventional methods); and (c) 
it produces a CM index that does not include its explanatory 
determinants (such as the level of education) in its definition 
and introduces two basic elements that point to the classic 
definition of democracy and public opinion (frequency of dis-
cussion about politics and attempts at persuasion), linking the 
individual level to the group level.
Method
In his study on European democracies, Inglehart (1990) 
establishes a series of hypotheses on the effects and evolu-
tion of CM. He basically considers three hypotheses:
1. Increased CM reduces the influence that politi-
cal parties have on public opinion and of citizens’ 
identification with political parties.
2. Because they are better educated and more 
informed, young people should show a greater 
degree of CM. In general, this increased level of 
cognitive political mobilization makes them more 
politically sophisticated.
3. A generalized increase in CM and participation is 
caused by (a) incorporation of women, (b) higher 
level of education, and (c) changes in evaluative 
priorities toward individual self-expression, to the 
detriment of the needs for survival.
The second thesis is the subject of validation and study in 
this analysis, by extending the data series originally used by 
Inglehart. We give a detailed consideration of two conclu-
sions regarding generational change and the process of 
political maturation among young people.
1. Inglehart checks these hypotheses by using Euroba-
rometer surveys from 1973 to 1987 and shows the 
trend toward greater CM in European societies. In 
terms of cohort analysis, people born after World War 
II who were young in the 1960s are the most politi-
cally mobilized. Although Inglehart observes the his-
torical period that this highly mobilized generation 
lived through (May 1968, mobilizations against the 
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war in Vietnam, the Prague Spring), he indicates that 
this maximum is reached through increased access to 
information and a higher level of education.
2. In his second hypothesis on generational change, 
Inglehart writes that younger people are less mobi-
lized because they need a period in which to mature 
politically and become incorporated into public life. 
A cohort analysis indicates that as young people 
“mature,” their CM increases. This is observed in the 
group born between 1956 and 1965, who begin as 
the second least politicized group in 1973 (they were 
below 18 years of age), and who quickly increase in 
political mobilization as they become adults, so that 
in 1983 they have become one of the most politicized 
cohorts, practically on a par with the cohort born 
between 1946 and 1955, as Inglehart explains:
Here, life cycle effects clearly are present –but they work 
in the opposite direction from than specified by the 
“aging produces disengagement” hipótesis: People are 
less apt to discuss politics during their preadult years, but 
upon reaching adulthood, the younger and more educated 
cohorts show higher rates of political discusión than do 
the older cohorts. This explains the anomaly . . . The 
youngest age group is, at any given point in time, less 
politicized than some of the older groups not because of 
a reversal of trends but because it has not yet reached 
political maturity. (Inglehart, 1990, pp. 346-347)
This article focuses on the hypotheses regarding the 
increase in CM among young people. Inglehart introduces 
cohort analysis to determine how the progressive global 
increase in levels of education has an effect on the CM of 
societies, in such a way that an increase would be observed 
in the level of politicization because the younger (better edu-
cated) generations replace less educated cohorts from the 
adult population. Thus, regarding Inglehart’s theses, the 
hypotheses to test in this article are the following:
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: The CM index is sensitive to political 
crises. Times of particular political and social unrest 
produce an increase in CM above the structural 
increases expected by the effect of the rise in levels 
of education and greater access to information.
Hypothesis 2: Political crises distort the sequence of 
political maturation and its relationship with CM, 
with two effects:
a. In these periods, younger generations reach greater 
levels of mobilization than generations that have 
reached maturity due to the life cycle.
b. These periods alter the substitution process (with 
regard to maximum levels of mobilization) of pre-
vious (less well-educated) cohorts by subsequent 
(better educated) cohorts, as the cohorts that live 
through these periods in their youth retain high 
rates of mobilization throughout their lives.
These hypotheses are tested for the set of updated data on 
CM that is available in the European Barometer database: in 
the first hypothesis, using an analysis on admissible cases 
such as that of the transition to democracy experienced by 
Southern European countries in the 1970s (Portugal, Greece, 
and Spain), which reproduce the climate of political inten-
sity and leave a political mark on a generation, and in the 
second, by incorporating data to the series so as to obtain a 
wider time frame than that used by Inglehart.
Indicators
CM is such a broad concept that reducing it to only a few indica-
tors leads to problems. Indeed, in developing his theory, Inglehart 
uses different indicators to explain changes in the societies ana-
lyzed. In The Silent Revolution, the index (four levels) is obtained 
from frequency of discussion and attempts at persuasion (leaving 
education to one side, as it correlated strongly with income and 
occupation), but in Culture Shift, Inglehart uses “frequency of 
discussion,” on one hand, for the analysis of cohorts as an indica-
tor of “potential political participation” (not CM), and discussion 
and instruction (five levels), on the other hand, to observe the 
influence on “unconventional political action” in different coun-
tries. In fact, the Eurobarometer contains two indexes: CM Index 
1 (discussion and persuasion without instruction; four levels) and 
CM Index 2 (discussion, persuasion, and instruction; five levels). 
Index 1 has the greatest temporal scope, as it allows the whole 
series to be established up to the present day.
This index is built using the combination of answers to two 
questions: how often people try to convince others of their own 
opinions (When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find 
yourself persuading your friends, relatives, or fellow workers 
to share your views? If so, does this happen often, from time to 
time, or rarely?) and how often political issues are discussed 
(When you get together with your friends, would you say you 
discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?) 
(Table 1).
The combination of these two questions (talking about 
politics and trying to convince) creates four levels of CM. The 
highest of these represents those who show the greatest degree 
of mobilization and participation in social life, and the two 
intermediary levels refer to qualities of cognitive political par-
ticipation above and below the average. The lowest refers to 
those with minimal social participation. Dichotomizing the 
index into two large categories produces “medium-high and 
high CM” and “medium-low and low CM.” The indicator 
directly expresses the degree of participation in political dis-
cussion spontaneously and individually, without it being 
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regulated or institutionalized. However, it is associated with 
the expected characteristics: Those with greater capacity for 
political mobilization also show greater interest in politics and 
a high level of education and media usage.
We used the indicators that the Eurobarometer produced 
from their theoretical contributions and empirical tests. The 
CM indicator resulting from the discussion on the concept in 
recent decades is set out in summarized form. As indicated 
above, although the importance of the level of education is 
assumed as an indicator of political competence and capac-
ity, the Eurobarometer dispenses with this variable due to its 
association with other factors that explain CM, such as social 
class.
However, the CM index that the Eurobarometer uses 
allows us to conduct empirical tests from the same data 
source that Inglehart used. In operative terms, this indicator 
separates the causes that lead to CM (education and informa-
tion) from mobilization in itself and is backed up by 
Inglehart’s initial definitions regarding direct political par-
ticipation in the agora as a place to debate public issues. 
Inglehart gives priority to variables that measure participa-
tion by means of conversation and discussion with others, 
and considers that this is a better indicator of activism than 
electoral participation figures. The Eurobarometer surveys 
include the variables “frequency of discussion on political 
issues” and “trying to convince others of one’s own opin-
ion,” thus qualifying (objective) conversation with a motiva-
tional element, expressed by the intent to convince others of 
one’s own opinion. This then is a definition of a specific con-
cept of participation that inserts debate about politics within 
the context of everyday life. This is why it is also used to 
detect “opinion leaders,” which in a way alludes to the notion 
of transmitting political information in two steps (Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944), without the involvement of 
mediating bodies such as political parties.
An important advance in Inglehart’s CM indicator is that 
education has been removed when creating the indicator. 
Education ensures that people are enabled to interpret infor-
mation coming from the media. It is clear that the role the 
media play in forming attitudes and opinions and in inter-
personal communication varies from one sociocultural 
context to another. The media’s influence differs widely 
depending on citizens’ level of education, which by theoretical 
association with CM brings the problem of interdependence 
on other variables such as social class. This identification 
can be observed in other very similar concepts, such as the 
political sophistication of MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and 
Listhaug (1995) and the political attention of Zaller (1992). 
Dalton (1984) produces an index using the variables of edu-
cation (degree of competence) and interest in politics 
(involvement and participation). Inglehart also initially 
includes level of education and participation in political dis-
cussion (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976) as 
an index of CM. A society’s level of education is incorpo-
rated into how the index is built because of the strong asso-
ciation between education and other indicators used to build 
the CM index. This makes several authors conclude that the 
level of education should be included in the index, despite 
its limitations (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). However, it does not 
appear to be a particularly useful contribution because the 
different meanings of the level of education indicator mean 
that it relates to three different socioeconomic indicators: 
competence and the objective education of individuals, 
social class/status, and socialization (Cassel & Lo, 1997). In 
all cases, the importance placed on interaction between indi-
viduals is a constant in the design of indicators of CM.
Another concept incorporated into the hypothesis test is 
that of crisis. A crisis is a moment in which the occurrence of 
a certain event with a certain degree of “impact” provokes 
high commotion in the population. In etic terms, political cri-
ses would be moments, within a broad spectrum of phenom-
ena, in which a substantial political change occurs, or there is 
major debate about the possibility of such a change, (a) of 
internal origin: regime change, reforms in the system, politi-
cal changes of a territorial nature, and economic reforms or 
(b) of external origin (with regard to other countries), the 
result of which ranges from diplomatic tension to military 
intervention.
Yet, however hard we try to complete and fine-tune this 
typology, it comes up against a phenomenological (emic) 
argument. Because these events have a major impact, the 
question of the perception of these occurrences is a central 
one. And because this is a question of perception, how citi-
zens interpret information becomes hugely relevant. In this 
sense, the mass media play a key role (their influence is indi-
rect, as the meaning belongs to the receiver) and indicators 
could be used (monitoring the media, where the events are 
placed in news media, emphasis measures—number of news 
and information items, font size, presence of images). These 
aspects have been discussed in a previous article (Alaminos 
& Penalva, 2010), in which the mass communication theory, 
particularly the agenda-setting theory and the framing the-
ory, is highly useful.
Building political climate indexes on the bases of media 
indicators (press distribution, content analysis, user num-
bers) for each country considered goes beyond the objectives 
Table 1. Cognitive Mobilization Index
Cognitive 
mobilization Persuade Discuss
Low Rarely, never, or DK/NA and Never or DK/NA
Medium low Rarely, never, or DK/NA and Occasionally
 Often, from time to time and Never or DK/NA
Medium high Rarely, never, or DK/NA and Frequently
 Often or from time to time and Occasionally
High Often or from time to time and Frequently
Source: Eurobarometer (adapted from Schmitt & Scholz, 2005)
Note: DK/NA = Don’t Know/Don’t Answer
6 SAGE Open
of this research. However, we find it hard to question certain 
moments of history as political crises according to previous 
attempts to classify them: the European cultural revolutions 
of the late 1960s, the transitions to democratic regimes in 
Southern Europe in the second half of the 1970s, and the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
Data and Sources
The data used is drawn from the Eurobarometers.1 It is impor-
tant to note that more years are considered than those studied 
by Inglehart and the data that the author used are included in 
the study. In this sense, the study replicates and extends his 
analysis. The Eurobarometer is a survey conducted in several 
European countries. For many years, the inclusion criteria 
were for the country to belong to the European Economic 
Community or the EU. However, the survey was extended to 
countries whose entry into the EU was pending. It is con-
ducted every 4 months and with an average sample size of 
1,000 interviews per country, a figure that varies depending 
on the population.
In particular, this work studies the effects on CM in two 
historic stages of notable political, social, and cultural unrest 
that had an extraordinary effect on various European societ-
ies: the mobilizations that occurred at the end of the 1960s in 
European countries with democratic regimes, typified by 
France in May 1968, and the mobilizations that occurred 
during the process of political transition in Mediterranean 
countries whose autocratic regimes came to an end in the 
mid-1970s (Greece, Portugal, and Spain).
Results
The results are presented as a graphic analysis. For each 
country, the distribution of relative frequencies of CM is 
charted each year in 10-year cohorts. The distributions are 
arranged in yearly intervals. In this way, it is possible to 
appreciate trends and inflections in the replacement of 
cohorts, and the structural relationship between them for each 
year. Each cohort is defined by the following age intervals, in 
years: 14 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 to 
74, and more than 74. Thus, graphical analysis (in a yearly 
base) is useful to appreciate cohort, period and aging effects.
The data is shown in three charts. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
two types of models (general patterns of evolution of CM and 
specific patterns of transition, respectively), and Figure 3 
shows a mixed model of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the landmark of unification in 1989, which can be com-
pared with the processes of transition experienced by the 
democracies of Southern Europe.
The growing trend of CM indices and the postwar generation. 
In general terms, the new data validate Inglehart’s hypothe-
ses. In the past four decades, the increase in the level of edu-
cation and the growth of and increased access to the media 
have been accompanied by an increase in the level of CM. 
The trend is clear and the hypothesis is partially confirmed. 
A rising trend can be observed in all the European countries 
considered. The cohorts born in postwar Europe are consid-
erably more mobilized than those born before World War II. 
However, no sustained growth in mobilization can be 
observed with each new cohort. On the contrary, the genera-
tion of the 1960s reaches a landmark in mobilization with 
regard to new generations, who have lower levels of partici-
pation. The maximums detected by Inglehart in the genera-
tion born in the postwar period distort this trend. These are 
remarkably high percentages of CM, leading to a series of 
considerations. First, it should be observed that they coincide 
with a particularly “hot” moment in history in terms of the 
political climate, which was characterized by a general atmo-
sphere of social and cultural revolution throughout Europe, 
expressed in the form of mass protests (the war in Vietnam, 
May 1968 in France, the Prague Spring), and in changes in 
customs and social norms, of which the main protagonists 
were the younger generations. Second, it can be seen how 
this distortion is prolonged in its effects, as the cohort in 
question maintains high rates of political mobilization dur-
ing the following decades, due to having experienced the 
most intense era of political socialization in those socially 
convulsive years. Thus, their high exposure to social and 
political participation remains and revolutionizes the genera-
tional structure. Subsequent generations tend to show less 
participation (due to there being fewer left-wing and other 
sociopolitical characteristics).
A very similar change dynamic, but with a different his-
toric origin, can be observed in the countries that lived 
through the transition to a democratic regime in the 1970s.
The process of maturation and new generational distortions 
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain). For Inglehart, the process of 
political maturation among young people raises their CM 
when they reach sufficient political competence. The effect 
of this maturation can be observed in the “horseshoe” shape 
of the time frame that marks the highest CM in cohorts aged 
25 to 34 years, who were previously aged 14 to 24 years. In 
Portugal, Greece, and Spain, a generational delay can be 
seen, in the extent to which the most participatory generation 
is that aged 14 to 24 years at the time of the political transi-
tion to democracy. The general process leads from an ordered 
linear generational structure in the functional relationship 
with CM to another horseshoe-shaped form (nonmonotonic 
linear). The stability of the generational position in the 
30-year period considered makes it possible to see the matu-
ration process and change of position in the life cycle. The 
cases of Greece and Spain experience a process of character-
istically horseshoe-shaped transformation, with young peo-
ple less participatory than those of the transition and a lesser 
variability among generations that can be seen when the seg-
ments are shortened. The case of Portugal is an exception. 
Young people maintain a high level of participation and the 
trend is one of increased variability between generations, as 
can be observed in the growth of the segment.
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United Kingdom (1975-2007) 
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Italy (1975-2007) 
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Figure 1. Percentage of medium-high and high cognitive mobilization by cohorts (France, United Kingdom, and Italy, 1975-2007)
Note: The asterisks show the percentage of cognitive political mobilization for each cohort in each sample extraction year from left to right (14-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and above 74 years). Each unbroken line marks the differences (segments between asterisks) between cohorts.
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 Portugal (1985-2007)
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Greece (1980-2007) 
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Spain (1985-2007)
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Figure 2. Percentage of medium-high and high cognitive political mobilization by cohorts. Portugal, Greece, and Spain
Note: The asterisks show the percentage of cognitive political mobilization for each cohort in each sample extraction year from left to right (14-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and above 74 years). Each unbroken line marks the differences (segments between asterisks) between cohorts.
Alaminos and Penalva 9
Within this horseshoe structure, which is very clear in the 
data expressed in 10-year cohorts, a subprocess occurs by 
which the new cohort that is incorporated appears with a 
very low level with regard to the previous cohort. The matu-
ration and life cycle effect means that this cohort, which is at 
such a low level, 10 years later reaches a similar level to that 
of the previous cohort. As previously in other European 
countries with regard to the generation of 1968, the genera-
tions that were politically socialized in the transition to 
democracy maintain a higher level of CM than those that 
succeed them. This generation, which “breaks” continuity, 
has higher levels of CM than those which replace it. This will 
have a clear statistical effect, first by weakening and then by 
breaking the association between age and CM. Each country 
shows specific features associated with the crises described.
However, this maturation process that marks a level of 
political participation associated with the life cycle displays 
nuances in moments of crisis. This can be observed by study-
ing generational patterns in certain moments of political 
upheaval, where younger people have the highest levels of 
mobilization. This is the case of Germany in the early 1990s 
after the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification process, 
of France with the disturbances in Paris protesting the situa-
tion of the immigrant population, and of Spain following the 
terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004.
In the transnational dimension, with the data from 1982, 
Inglehart saw Greece as an atypical case: a country with a low 
economic level but high CM. He defined this as a “striking 
deviant case” in his cross-sectional analysis and interpreted it 
as an effect of the influence of the tradition of the former city-
state democracies. The effect of the period of transition to 
democracy, which was not considered by Inglehart, could be 
a better explanation and could also explain the historical 
maximums found in our analysis: the generation that was 
young in the political climate of 1968 records a maximum 
level. Subsequent generations, with higher levels of mobiliza-
tion than those born after World War II, tend to be compara-
tively lower than those of 1968. The same occurs for the 
generations that lived through those times of transition to 
democracy in the countries considered.
We present a mixed model, between the postwar society 
type of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, and the soci-
ety in transition type of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The 
Federal Republic of Germany shows patterns from both 
models, which strengthens the hypothesis. On one hand, 
there is a trend of increasing political mobilization among 
successive postwar generations, with a sharp increase in 
mobilization scores for the generation involved in the 1968 
mobilizations. On the other hand, the early 1990s show a 
change in the basic horseshoe shape in the change of cohorts, 
with an increase in mobilization observed in younger genera-
tions, canceling out the process of political maturation. This 
is a politically hot moment reflecting the reunification pro-
cess after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this work, as well as the general trend of modernization 
that can be seen in all the societies studied, it is also possible 
to observe the foreseeable anomalies of each case, reflecting 
the historical political circumstance of each country. 
Inglehart’s hypotheses are subtly altered. The advantages of 
having a longer historical series than that which the author 
used means that we can state that the historic period at the 
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Figure 3. Percentage of medium-high and high cognitive political mobilization for each cohort Federal Republic of Germany (1975-2007)
Note: The asterisks show the percentage of cognitive political mobilization for each cohort in each sample extraction year from left to right (14-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and above 74 years). Each unbroken line marks the differences (segments between asterisks) between cohorts.
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end of the 1960s crossed with the general rising trend in 
levels of education and the availability of and access to the 
media. By taking other historic moments of increased politi-
cal tension, we can state that the period effect explains the 
trends more precisely, and explains the anomalies that Inglehart 
found, as is the case for Greece. He interpreted this anomaly 
as the repercussion of the country’s classical tradition linked 
to political discussion in the agora.
We consider that in his works, Inglehart gave sufficient 
consideration to two of the three effects considered in cohort 
analysis: that of maturation (in terms of the process of acquir-
ing political competence) and that of cohort (which explains 
how patterns of mobilization are maintained depending on the 
time in history when political socialization is most intense). 
However, he underestimated the importance of time period. 
The period effect affects society as a whole, corresponding to 
an exceptional political or social climate. We know it is not 
possible to determine the effect that, independently, can be 
attributed to the period, age, or cohort. As Glenn (2005) states, 
the effect of cohort (C, year of birth), the effect of age (A, year 
since birth), and period (P, current year) are linear and addi-
tive. Separated effects can not be estimated.
To illustrate the effect of the period and its interaction 
with cohort and maturation, this article includes similar 
political situations (in terms of the intensity of the political 
climate and its effects on political participation in general) 
such as the political transition of the European countries con-
sidered (Greece, Portugal, and Spain). Thus, considering this 
effect, Inglehart’s conclusions must be modified, as it can be 
confirmed that the historical maximum in CM of the genera-
tion of 1968 is due to the atypical context of the political 
climate.
Thus, even though CM effectively defines a potential for 
participation, whether this is activated depends on the con-
text. Political crises raise the level of mobilization in general, 
but this increase occurs to a greater extent in younger cohorts, 
who are more qualified in cognitive terms. The level of 
mobilization shows a growing trend for a set of countries 
that already had high levels of mobilization. For another set 
of countries, it can be seen how this average level tends to 
remain stable, with changes in growth and contraction that 
coincide with “hot” periods or political crises. In this sense, 
it is not appropriate to consider as a general thesis that 
increases in the number of citizens with CM capacities are a 
direct and mechanical consequence of conditions such as 
education, available media, or economic development. 
Rather, for certain countries, CM (talking about and discuss-
ing politics with other citizens) develops circumstantially, 
depending on the sociopolitical context and climate. Within 
the average level of mobilization displayed by society, it can 
be seen how the indicator is sensitive to the most relevant 
crises, leading to discontinuous trends and altering the pro-
cess of political maturation. With the consideration of con-
textual and circumstantial factors, the CM index would 
show greater utility when diagnosing, understanding, and 
foreseeing social mobilizations, as it considers a key element 
of its theoretical definition to be direct democracy and the 
consideration of unconventional forms of participation, 
which are more present at times of crisis.
Therefore, by introducing the period element, two of 
Inglehart’s statements need modifying: the first, which states 
that the level of education automatically has an influence on 
levels of CM by raising participation as a structural pattern, 
and the second, which considers the life cycle as a necessary 
element of political maturation. Inglehart’s theses do not 
give sufficient consideration to CM as a potential that is acti-
vated by reacting to circumstances to the point of producing 
functional discontinuous patterns in the relationship between 
age and CM, as well as distortions in the process of political 
maturation and its relationship with the life cycle.2 Certain 
historic events mobilize younger generations who, according 
to Inglehart, should not have reached that level of political 
maturity. These crises clearly mark the trends of mobiliza-
tion for all his biography, as these events coincide with the 
era of greatest political socialization. As can be deduced in 
the analysis, “testing” the direct democracy that Inglehart 
spoke of at times when the process of socialization (youth) is 
at its most intense allows tools and knowledge of political 
practice to be acquired that will be retained for the rest of 
one’s life. This political learning is supported by the cogni-
tive basis of education and information but reinforces the 
pragmatic (rational) dimension of “political efficacy” and 
the identity (emotional) dimension due to the links within a 
group acquired in that generational experience.
There are a series of works that deals with a closely 
related concept, namely “political generation,” as discussed 
by Mannheim, which links the political experiences of each 
cohort in the most intense periods of socialization, as youth 
tends to be. We have found some studies that discuss the phe-
nomenon of political socialization by linking the period and 
cohort effects, such as the works by Cavalli (2004), Hooghe 
(2004), Hadjar and Beck. As stated by Hooghe,
In this view, primary socialisation experiences tend to 
produce persistent effects, which are only marginally 
influenced by later socialisation experiences. This 
concept of persistent political self-identification is of 
course nothing new, as it already was formulated in 
Karl Mannheim’s classical thesis on the creation of 
“political generations” by what he called generation-
defining events. (p. 334)
Hadjar and Beck (2010) also clearly explain this relation-
ship between experiences of political crises and period effects:
Period effects are expressions of societal events, 
political developments, value climate and societal 
conditions, both on the structural and ideological level 
that affect all birth cohorts in a specific country . . . 
Causes of period effects may be very polarising election 
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campaigns, the introduction of controversial laws, 
unemployment, or a general distance from politicians 
after political scandals. (p. 537)
It is important, in light of the discussion of concepts and 
the findings presented in this work, to remain open to new 
knowledge that is being incorporated to perfect this index. 
The qualitative (specifically biographical) methodology 
would improve knowledge of the phenomenon of CM and 
how it connects with the socializing effect of the period lived 
through (in the primary group or in the corresponding gen-
eration). Detailed knowledge of the phenomenon could put 
an end to the confusion detected by various authors between 
cause (elements that give shape to a potential mobilization) 
and effects (mobilization at a specific time).
Declaration of Conf licting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to 
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for 
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This 
research was made possible by a grant from the Ministry of Education, 
Government of Spain in the 2010 official announcement:” Estancias 
de profesores e investigadores seniors en centrosextranjeros de 
enseñanza superior e investigación” (Ref. PR2010-0133).
Notes
1. The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002 (ZA3521; 
Schmitt & Scholz, 2005), and Eurobarometers: 68.2 ZA 4742 
Nov-Dec 2007, 68.1 ZA 4565 Sep-Nov 2007, 67.3 ZA 4561 
May-Jun 2007, 67.2 ZA 4530 Apr-May 2007, 67.1 ZA 4529 Feb-
Mar 2007, 66.3 ZA 4528 Nov-Dec 2006, 66.2 ZA 4527 Oct-Nov 
2006, 66.1 ZA 4526 Sep-Oct 2006, 65.4 ZA 4508 Jun-Jul 2006, 
65.3 ZA 4507 May-Jun 2006, 65.2 ZA 4506 Mar-May 2006, 
65.1 ZA 4505 Feb-Mar 2006, 64.3 ZA 4415 Nov-Dec 2005, 64.2 
ZA 4414 Oct-Nov 2005, 64.1 ZA 4413 Sep-Oct 2005, 63.5 ZA 
4412 Jun-Jul 2005, 63.4 ZA 4411 May-Jun 2005, 63.3 ZA 4410 
Mar-Apr 2005, 63.2 ZA 4234 Feb-Mar 2005, 63.1 ZA 4233 Jan-
Feb 2005, 62.2 ZA 4231 Nov-Dec 2004, 62.1 ZA 4230 Oct-Dec 
2004, 62.0 ZA 4229 Oct-Nov 2004, 61 ZA 4056 Feb-Mar 2004, 
60.3 ZA 3940 Nov-Dec 2003, 60.2 ZA 3939 Nov-Dec 2003, 
60.1 ZA 3938 Oct-Nov 2003, 60.0 ZA 3937 Sep 2003, 59.2 ZA 
3905 May-Jun 2003, 59.1 ZA 3904 Mar-Apr 2003, 59.0 ZA 
3903 Jan-Feb 2003.
2. In Inglehart’s (1990) studies, for the definition of Cognitive 
Mobilization, the period effect is treated tangentially, because 
it estimates that it is an effect that tends to be annulled in the 
long term with the progressive incorporation of new cohorts. 
He does consider it, however (introducing the temporal series 
of inflation indexes), as an indicator that is close to his hypoth-
esis of scarcity. Inglehart concludes that although its influence 
should be taken into account, differentiating between the three 
effects (age, cohort, and period) is a very hard task.
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